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Regionalism and Sub-regionalism in the Caribbean: 
 Challenges and Prospects - 
Any Insights from Europe?
 
 
Wendy Grenade
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the complexities of regional integration in the developing world and the 
internal and external forces that shape regional and sub-regional groupings. The main contention 
is that moments of uncertainty and stagnation at the regional level act as incentives for deeper 
sub-regionalism.  The  paper  explores  the  challenges  and  prospects  within  the  Caribbean 
Community  (CARICOM)  and  the  sub-regional  grouping  of  the  Organisation  of  Eastern 
Caribbean States (OECS) and analyses the extent to which the European Union‟s (EU‟s) model 
has influenced regional integration in the Caribbean.   
 
Key  words:  Caribbean  Community  (CARICOM),  European  Union,  Economic  partnership 
Agreement, Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States, regional integration and globalisation 
 
Introduction 
 
The recent global financial and economic crisis has brought to the fore the complexities of the 
post-Cold War capitalist order. The convergence of old and new threats continue to reconfigure 
the global landscape. In the face of uncertainty, corporate enterprises and sovereign states are 
preoccupied with competitiveness and viability as the peoples of the world search for security in 
their daily lives, democracy and hope. Recent uprisings in parts of Europe and the Middle East 
bring into question the contradictions of the global political and economic order. At the same 
time, potential poles of power are emerging; such as China, Russia, India and Brazil, providing 
alternative policy options and multiple platforms for engagement. Within this maze, regional 
integration continues to be necessary but problematic. The current moment is both a threat and an 
incentive for regional integration schemes. Sovereign states are  forced to turn their attention 
inward  as  economic  instability  and  societal  disorder  threaten  political  capital.  Yet,  as  global 
forces rage, states are also forced to seek refuge in collective regional arrangements, which act as 
logical buffers. While this is not new, a large question is, whither regional integration in the 
contemporary global era? 
                                                            
   
  An  earlier  version  of  this  paper  was  first  presented  at  the  European  Union  Twelfth  Biennial  International 
Conference on the panel The European Union in Latin America, Hyatt Regency Boston, Boston Massachusetts March 
3-5, 2011. I wish to thank Professor Sebastian Royo for his comprehensive comments as discussant for the panel. I also 
wish to thank Professor Joaquin Roy, the other panellists and colleagues who commented on the paper.  
   
 Wendy Grenade holds a Ph.D. and MA in International Studies from the University of Miami, with concentrations 
in Comparative Politics and International Relations. She has authored several scholarly articles on regional integration, 
Caribbean-EU relations, Caribbean governance and politics in post revolutionary Grenada. Dr. Grenade is currently a 
Lecturer in Political Science, Department of Government, Sociology and Social Work, the University of the West 
Indies, Cave Hill Campus.  Prior to joining the faculty at UWI she lectured at Florida Atlantic University, and was a 
Research Associate at the European Union Centre, University of Miami.  Dr. Grenade was also employed with the 
Government of Grenada in the Public Sector and in the Grenada Diplomatic Service, with postings in Washington, 
D.C. and London.  Dr. Grenade has also been recognised for her research and publication at the Cave Hill Campus for 
2008-2009. 
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The European Union (EU) is the most advanced regional integration project in the world. 
It is characterized by a unique mix of intergovernmentalism and supranationality and supported 
by strong networks and interests. Beginning with the creation of the European Coal and Steel 
Community  (ECSC)  in  the  1950s  to  the  current  Lisbon  Treaty,
2  the EU has simultaneously 
deepened and widened its regional project. In the proce ss it has created a number of common 
institutions which have acted as a catalyst to sustain integration. In so doing, it has made 
advances in a number of areas including a common currency – the Euro -  an internal market and 
the harmonization of policies in a number of issue areas.
3 However, while the EU may be an 
economic superpower it continues to be a political dwarf.
4  Some of its  challenges include 
incohesive foreign policies, monetary instability, democratic deficits and questions of legitimacy. 
Nonetheless, the EU remains an example of regional integration and it provides useful insights 
for the rest of the world.
  
In  the  Global  South,  as  is  the  case  within  the  Caribbean  Community  (CARICOM), 
regional projects also experience moments of advance and stagnation. These are often linked to 
the interplay between internal political, economic and socio-cultural dynamics and larger global 
forces.    The  situation  is  compounded  particularly  for  post-colonial  countries.  Despite  strong 
incentives to integrate, the process of integration is often haunted by historical ghosts;  
compromised by conditions of vulnerability, poverty and insecurity; undermined by the lack of 
political will and popular support and stymied by the absence of common institutions. Within this 
context the central question this paper seeks to address is, what accounts for relatively deeper 
levels of integration at the sub-regional level in the Caribbean? A further question is, to what 
extent has the EU influenced regional integration in the Caribbean?  
After  this  introduction,  the  paper  presents  a  brief  theoretical  overview  of  regional 
integration.  It  then  provides  an  overview  of  the  current  state  of  CARICOM  and  the  OECS, 
drawing insights from the EU. The final section of the paper presents conclusions and suggestions 
for further research. 
 
Regional Integration:  A Conceptual Guide 
 
The  study  of  regional  integration  is  not  new.    The  1950s  and  1960s  saw  the  first  wave  of 
integration theories which were used to conceptualize the early stages of European integration. 
One of the classical debates in the field surrounded neo-functionalism and inter-governmentalism. 
Neo-functionalism advances the notion that national governments are willing to cede sovereignty 
over certain matters to regional institutions, which can then make laws and policies that are 
binding  upon  those  governments.    In  this  respect  regional  integration  refers  to  “the  process 
whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, 
expectations  and  political  activities  to  a  new  center  whose  institutions  possess  or  demand 
jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states.”
5 This perspective holds that the momentum for 
integration could be maintained where supranational agencies were given tasks that facilitated the 
                                                            
   
2 After a difficult ratification process, on 1 December, 2009 the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force. This marked the 
culmination of a process which began with the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, followed by the Nice Treaty in 2002 and the 
controversial Constitutional Treaty in 2004.  The Lisbon Treaty is the latest expression of the European integration 
process which is intended to enhance the efficiency of the Union and improve the coherence of its operations. See  
Treaty of Lisbon EUROPA (http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/index_en.htm) Accessed 18 February, 2011. 
   
3 For comprehensive accounts of the European integration process see Elizabeth Boomberg and Al exander Stubb, 
2003; Desmond Dinan, 2005; Roy H. Ginsberg, 2007; John McCormick, 2002; John Van Oudenaren, 2000. 
   
4 The EU continues to show incohesion in its foreign policy. Its latest delayed collective response to the crises in 
Tunisia and Egypt are cases in point (see “Ashton accused of „playing second violin‟ on Egypt” BBC Democracy Live 
Wednesday  2  February,  2011.    http://news.bbc.co.uk/democracylive/hi/europe/newsid_9382000/9382637.stm. 
Accessed 18 February, 2011. 
   
5 Haas, 1958, p. 16.   5   
upgrading  of  common  interests.  This  is  based  on  the  concept  of  spill-over,  where  limited 
cooperation in one functional area will spill over into other areas as well.  
In the wake of the empty chair crisis
6in Europe in the 1960s, Hoffman  challenged neo-
functional logic and pointed to the influence of the „national situation‟ and external forces on 
regional integration. He argued that “[e]very international system owes its inner logic and its 
unfolding to the diversity of domestic determinants, geo-historical situations and outside aims 
among its units.”
7 Thus inter-governmentalism draws on the realist paradigm to explain regional 
integration.  Key assumptions include: (1) the state is the primary actor in international affairs; (2) 
the main reason for a state‟s existence is survival; (3) national interests are paramount; (4) the 
struggle  for  power  underpins  relations  among  states.  Hence,  inter-governmentalism  is  an 
approach to integration in which national governments establish institutions and procedures to 
pursue common interests but in which those governments retain the ultimate authority to pursue 
an  independent  policy  if  they  desire.  With  this  approach,  although  sovereignties  are  pooled, 
member states remain sovereign entities in the international arena. Proponents argue that those 
who  expect  to  lose  from  integration  will  oppose  it.  In  essence,  countries  tend  to  pursue 
intergovernmental  integration  when  they  want  to  reap  the  benefits  of  cooperation  without 
surrendering their independence. Regional integration can therefore be understood as a series of 
bargains among the political leaders of the major states in a region as the result of converging 
preferences  among  these  leaders.  As  Moravcsik  observes,  integration  is  advanced  by  the 
convergence  of  interests  –  commercial  interests  of  powerful  economic  producers,  macro-
economic  interests  of  ruling  government  coalitions  and  structural  incentives  in  the  global 
economy.
8 
Political scientists in the developing world emphasize a developmental view.  As Axline
9  
indicates, while classical theories have been successfully applied to Western Europe, in the case 
of the developing world, an understanding of regional integration requires a different theoretical 
approach born out of an understanding of the world‟s political economy.  In this context, regional 
integration  is  viewed  as  “collective  self-reliance”  which  provides  member  countries  with  a 
stronger platform with which to interact with the global political economy and pursue relations 
with other groups and countries. This perspective underscores the point that regional integration 
is not an end in itself but can be evaluated in terms of its contribution to development.  
The New Regionalism Theory (NRT) goes further and seeks to explain the complexities 
of  regionalisation  in  the  context  of  the  new  wave  of  globalisation.  Regional  integration  is 
conceived as “a complex process of change simultaneously involving state as well as non-state 
actors  and  occurring  as  a  result  of  global,  regional,  national  and  local  level  forces.”
10  The 
fundamental premise is that regions are emerging phenomenon, ambiguously both forming part of 
and  driving,  as  well  as  reacting  against  and  modifying  the  global  order.  Hettne
11  also 
distinguishes between regional integration in the developed and developing worlds. He contends 
that core regions are coherent, politically strong, well organized at the supranational level, not 
only economically growing but leading in technological innovation.  Further, core regions are 
„policy-makers‟ which organize for the sake of being better able to control the rest of the world, 
the world outside of their own region and compete among themselves in exercising this influence. 
Peripheral regions, on the other hand, are „policy-takers‟ since they are politically more turbulent 
                                                            
    
6 French President, Charles de Gualle was largely responsible for vetoing the British membership applications in 
1963 and Guallist objections to proposals for institutional reform lay at the heart of the so-called „empty chair‟ crisis in 
Europe in the 1960s, when France withdrew from EU business for a portion of 1965 (Thody, 1998). 
   
7 Hoffman, 1966, pp 864-65. 
   
8 See  Moravcsik, 1998. 
   
9 Axline, 1977. 
   
10 Hettne and Söderbaum, 2002, p. 33. 
   
11 Hettne, 2001, 5.   6   
and economically more stagnant.  Consequently they have to organize in order to stop the threat 
of marginalization.   
 
The Caribbean Community: A Brief Overview  
 
The  Caribbean  Community  (CARICOM)  continues  to  face  grave  challenges  in  its  quest  to 
achieve sustainable development. High public debt; the fall-out from the global financial and 
economic crisis; continued vulnerability to natural disasters; the HIV/AIDS pandemic, the illicit 
drug trade and its attendant violence and criminality are but a few of the common threats facing 
the region. So grave are the security threats that CARICOM included security as its fourth pillar 
in 2008. On the macro-economic front, there is a mixed picture. The economies of the Bahamas, 
Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, St. Kitts and Nevis and St. Lucia are performing relatively well 
when compared to Jamaica, Guyana and Haiti. In fact Haiti continues to be a special case in 
CARICOM (see Table I). 
 
 
 
Table I:  Selected Indicators for CARICOM and the OECS  
Country  Population 
(2009) 
‘000    persons 
at mid-year 
Per Capita GDP at Constant Market Prices  HDI  2006 
Rank* 
    1995  2000  2004  2005  2006  2007   
**Anguilla  13,000  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA 
Antigua  & 
Barbuda 
87,000  7,912.4  8,650.3  9,584.1  9,900.2  11,007.
4 
11,965.
9 
59 
Bahamas  339,000  15,530.1  18,235.
9 
17,170.
5 
17,526.
4 
18,115.
4 
18,392.
7 
49 
Barbados  296,00  5,232.5  6,025.1  6,087.8  6,327.7  6,516.4  6,705.8  37 
Belize  300,000  2,920.0  3,400.8  3,896.5  3,925.1  4,018.9  3,982.1  88 
**British 
Virgin 
Islands 
23,000  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA 
The 
Commonwea
lth  of 
Dominica 
67,000  3,584.4  3,962.2  4,001.2  4,146.6  4,373.5  4,538.9  77 
Grenada  105,000  3,047.7  4,278.2  4,090.8  4,552.7  4,449.6  4,608.8  86 
Guyana  734,000  700.5  806.8  836.9  820.1  862.5  910.3  110 
Haiti  9,932,000  413.0  427.3  383.0  383.7  386.2  392.1  148 
Jamaica  2,742,000  2,979.0  2,848.2  2,932.7  2,955.5  3,010.3  3,028.4  87 
*Montserrat  6,000  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA 
St.  Kitts  & 
Nevis 
52,000  6,108.2  7,148.4  7,566.0  7,889.9  8,198.1  8,413.4  60 
St. Lucia  122,000  4,149.7  4,627.3  4,757.0  4,985.7  5,127.8  5,127.4  66 
St.  Vincent 
&  The 
169,000  2,543.9  2,889.4  3,245.6  3,345.3  3,647.4  3,907.6  92   7   
Grenadines 
Suriname  463,000  1,722.4  1,774.9  2,124.6  2,229.3  2,343.7  2,453.7  89 
Trinidad  & 
Tobago 
1,343,000  4,461.3  6,269.9  8,653.8  9,309.5  10,388.
6 
10,915.
5 
57 
 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2009, pp 23 & 88. 
*United Nations Human Development Report, 2006;  **British Overseas Territory; NA: Data 
Not Available. 
 
CARIFORUM-EC Economic Partnership Agreement – Is the EU a Friend or Foe? 
 
One of the challenges which confront the region is the need to adjust to the new trade regime of 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO). One example relates to the controversial CARIFORUM-
EC Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA). By way of background, there has been a long-
standing relationship between Europe and the Caribbean dating back to the periods of slavery and 
colonialism  and  the  post-colonial  North-South  preferential  aid  and  trade  arrangements.
12 
However, within the new global trading environment, Lomé IV expired in February, 2000 and the 
Cotonou Agreement was subsequently signed in June 2000, and entered into force on April 1 
2003.  The main objective of the economic and trade cooperation as outlined in Article 34 of the 
Agreement is to foster “the smooth and gradual integration of the ACP countries into the world 
economy with due regard to their political choices and development priorities, thereby promoting 
their sustainable development and contributing to poverty eradication in the ACP countries.”
13 
The new agreement is designed to address the inadequacies of the Lomé Conventions through the 
inclusion of a wide range of innovative provisions for expanded cooperation, political dialogue in 
the areas of trade and economic cooperation, including direct assistance to the productive sectors.   
It was also agreed that new WTO compatible arrangements governing trade between the ACP 
Group and the EU would be put in place by 2008.  It is necessary to note that the EPAs are 
negotiated between the EU and CARIFORUM, which includes all CARICOM member states in 
addition to the Dominican Republic (with Cuba as an observer).
14 
In December, 2008 the first EPA was signed between CARIFORUM and the EC.
15 A 
fundamental difference between the EPAs and the Lomé Conventions is that the EPAs are based 
                                                            
   
12 In 1975 the European Community (EC) and forty-six African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) States entered into the 
first Lomé Convention, which provided for non -reciprocal trade concessions, development aid and i nstitutional 
association  with  the  EC.  Cooperation  focused  on  two  key  elements:  economic  cooperation  and  development 
cooperation.  The aim of the Convention was to establish a new model for relations between developed and developing 
states compatible with the aspirations of the international community towards a more just and more balanced economic 
order. The Lomé Conventions was one of the North -South cooperation agreements, which was aimed to promote the 
development of the ACP states.  ACP products included items such as bananas, sugar, rice and rum. The main financial 
and technical instruments of the partnership were the European Development Bank (EDF) and the resources of the 
European Investment Bank (EIB). The ACP States also benefited from lower prices due to the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP).   This arrangement was considered essential for ACP States since tariff preferences alone did not ensure 
access to the EU market at via ble prices.  Over the years, the number of ACP countries increased from the original 
forty-six to seventy-nine. The EDF grew from ECU3.053,3 million in the first five -year period to ECU14.300 billion 
for the 1996-2000 funding cycle.  This, along with bilateral assistance from the EU member states and other assistance 
provided from the EU budget, made the EU and its Member States by far the largest source of aid for the ACP States.   
   
13 ACP-EU Partnership Agreement 2000, 25, Consolidated text. 
   
14 For an analysis of the Cotonou Agreements and the EPAs see Elgström and Pilegaard, 2008; Gasiorek and Winters 
2004. 
   
15  The  EPA  was  signed  on  October  15  2008  by  the  European  Community  and  the  following  members  of 
CARIFORUM: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados , Belize, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, 
 Jamaica, Saint Christopher and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago. 
Guyana later signed on October 20, 2008. Haiti signed the Agreement on December 11 200 9. The EPA was created 
through an intense negotiating process which was undertaken within four (4) stages over a period of three years. Phase   8   
on reciprocal trade, that is, the end of preferential treatment.  Another significant feature of the 
EPAs is that they were negotiated between the EU and a divided ACP – six ACP geographic 
regions.  The signing of the EPA invoked intense debate in the Caribbean. On the one hand 
supporters of the Agreement cited its strengths. Ambassador Richard Bernal, former head of the 
Caribbean  Regional  Negotiating  Machinery  (CRNM)
16  explains  that  since  the  Caribbean 
economies are highly open and export driven, access to the EU‟s „vast and lucrative‟  market of 
50 million consumers presents potential opportunities for the Caribbean. Bernal emphasizes that 
the EPA is a trade and not an aid agreement. In that vein he points out that given the end of 
preferences and the long-standing relationship with Europe and the realities of the WTO rules-
based trade regime, it was necessary to sign the EPA. Bernal cautioned naysayers that small 
countries have „no entitlement to aid‟ and as middle income developing countries the Caribbean 
states had to get off this habit of development assistance. He points out that Caribbean countries 
needed  instead  to  become  more  internationally  competitive.  According  to  Bernal,  „trade 
liberalization will not automatically give benefits but it creates opportunities but if these have to 
come to fruition we have to make use of them‟ he said.
17 
Former Prime Minister of Barbados, the Right Honourable Own Arthur, reflected on the 
EPA in this way: 
 
When Caribbean Heads of Government met in Georgetown, 7
th December, 2007 to give a 
mandate to our negotiators to conclude a new Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) 
with  the  European  Union,  we  did  so  conscious  of  the  historical  significance  of  the 
moment, but even more conscious of our obligations to this, and to future generations. 
    We were also in no doubt about the complexity and the sheer enormity of the task 
about to be undertaken. 
    We were well aware that a new EPA would effectively transform the character of the 
economic relationship between the Caribbean and Europe that had been embodied in 
Four LOME Conventions – a relationship that had come to be celebrated as the only 
working model of North-South Cooperation ever devised. 
    We would have been equally aware that notwithstanding the advantage that the LOME 
Conventions  had  been  intended  to  confer  on  ACP  countries  because  of  their  special 
                                                                                                                                                                             
IV  of  the  negotiating  process  or  the  finalization  process,  which  led  to  the  ultimate  conclusion  of  the  EPA 
negotiation in December 2007, was preceded by the critical Phase III of the negotiation process. Launched 
in September 2005, Phase III of the EPA negotiations underwent a qualitative shift in focus and specificity. 
Building on Phase I and Phase II discussions which focused on regional integration content, processes and 
ambition within CARIFORUM, Phase III constituted the structuring and consolidation of negotiations, so 
that the points of common understanding could be channelled into elements of the EPA Agreement.  This 
Phase  continued  until  the  later  part  of  2006.   What  follows  takes  stock  of  the  background  of  EPA 
negotiations and the importance of the EPA to CARIFORUM. The negotiation of the EPA took place at 
three  tiers,  namely:  Ministerial,  Principal  Negotiators  and  subject-specific  negotiators.  The  Lead 
Ministerial Spokesperson for EPA for the Region was Dame Billie Miller, Senior Minister and Minister of 
Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade-Barbados.  The former Director General of the Caribbean Regional 
Negotiating Machinery (RNM), Ambassador Dr. Richard Bernal, served as the CARIFORUM Principal 
Negotiator.   At  the  technical  level,  negotiations  were  conducted  by  members  of  the  EPA  College  of 
Negotiators.   See  “CARIFORUM  Economic  Partnership  Agreement  Negotiations” 
(http://www.crnm.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=276&Itemid=76&0872a8d70c62
52b77261d45b4779477d=86013e6221f2460ae98b3869465636a8) Accessed 19 February 2011. 
   
16  The  CRNM  has  evolved  into  the  Office  of  Trade  Negotiations  (OTN)  within  the  CARICOM 
Secretariat. 
   
17Bernal,  Richard  L.  CARIFORUM -EU  Economic  Partnership  Agreement  Part  1   Face 
(http://bl157w.blu157.mail.live.com/default.aspx?wa=wsignin1.0)  Facebook  Video.  Part  II 
(http://www.facebook.com/video/video.php?v=1424658991041). Viewed 19 February, 2011. 
   9   
preferential arrangements, the ACP‟s share of the European market had fallen from 6.7% 
in 1976 to 2.8% by 2000. 
    We could hardly have ignored the fact that significant aspects of the LOME regimes, 
which bore directly on the fortunes of important economic sectors in the Caribbean, had 
already  been  subject  to  successful  challenge  by  other  countries  within  the  Dispute 
Resolution Mechanisms of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
    In a broader sense we could not help but be aware that the days when Europe could 
confer on Caribbean societies special trade benefits that it was not prepared to grant to 
other  developing  countries,  without  making  any  benefits  consistent  with  international 
trade law and agreements, were over. 
    Having  regard  to  the  dynamics  of  contemporary  Caribbean  development,  it  was 
difficult for us to escape the conclusion that the old order which focused our relationship 
with Europe on the trade in goods only, and the grant of aid, bore no sensible relation to 
the requirements of modernizing and transforming societies.
18 
 
Former  Prime  Minister  Owen  Arthur  captures  the  essence  of  the  debate  from  the 
perspective of those supportive of the EPA. However, on the other side of the debate, leading 
Caribbean scholars and intellectuals took issue with the EPA. Professor Clive Thomas wrote 
relentlessly on the issue.
19 Key concerns relate to market access for goods and services into the 
EU market,  development support, rules of origin, technical barriers to trade and Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Standards.‟ According to Professor Norman Girvan, the EPA relies „on reciprocal 
trade liberalization between highly unequal partners to achieve its development objectives.‟
20 My 
questions  are:  can  an  unequal  global  competitor  be  a  genuine  „partner‟?  Is  competitive 
cooperation possible across the North-South divide? What are the implications of the EPA for the 
Caribbean Single Market and the OECS Economic Union? What does it mean for future relations 
between CARICOM, the Dominican Republic and Cuba? The scope of this paper does not allow 
for deeper probing of such questions. However CARIFORUM-EC EPA represents a shift in the 
„partnership‟ between the Caribbean and the EU. 
The institutions of CARICOM and CARIFORUM have responsibility to implement the 
EPA. However, the controversial negotiations and eventual signing of the EPA coincided with the 
ousted of incumbents in a number of CARICOM countries. In fact, a „wind of change‟ blew 
through the Caribbean from 2006 to 2009
21 and those changes at the domestic level slowed down 
the pace of EPA implementation. To compound the matter, subsequent to the signing of the EC-
CARIFORUM EPA, the global financial and econom ic crisis had significant implications for 
economies in Europe and in the Caribbean.
22  Therefore, two years after coming on stream an 
                                                            
   
18 The Right Honourable Owen Arthur, Presentation at the Private Sector Organisation of Jamaica Chairman‟s Club 
Forum “Making the Most of the EPA‟ Jamaica Pegasus Hotel, February 3, 2009.   
   
19 See Professor Clive Thomas‟ series   Guyana and the Wider World in Stabroek News during 2008 posted on 
(http://www.GuyanaCaribbeanpolitics.com).  For  example,  Thomas‟  articles  such  as,  „Putting  the  EPA  in  Context: 
Observations  on  Antecedent  CARICOM-EU  arrangements‟  posted  January  27,  2008;  „Suckered:  The  Economic 
Partnership Agreement (EPA) as massive manipulation‟ posted January 20, 2008; „Establishing SIDA and sabotaging 
it: Casuality of the EPA!‟ posted February 3, 2008; „Design and architecture of the EPA: The importance of self-
critique‟ posted February 24, 2008. The debate on the EPA was also captured on Professor Norman Girvan‟s website 
(http://www.normangirvan.info/economic-partnership-agreement-epa/).  
   
20Professor  Norman Girvan „The CARIFORUM-EC EPA A Critical Evaluation  - The devil is in the detail‟ April 27, 
2008 pp 1-4. 
   
21 Incumbents were defeated in general elections in the following Caribbean countries during 2006 -2009: St. Lucia 
(11 December, 2006); The Commonwealth of the Bahamas (2 May, 2007); Jamaica (3 September, 2007); Barbados (15 
January, 2008)  Belize (7 February, 2008); Grenada (8 July, 2008); Trinidad and Tobago (24 May, 2010) and Suriname 
(25 May, 2010). 
   
22 For further analysis in the global financial and economic crisis see Sanoussi Bilal “Implications of the Global crisis 
for the ACP-EU Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) December 7, 2009. 
(http://www.thebrokeronline.eu/en/Online-discussions/Blogs/Redeveloping-finance/Implications-of-the-Global-Crisis-
for-the-ACP-EU-Economic-Partnership-Agreements-EPAs) Accessed 19 February 2011 and The Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2008.   10   
assessment was done on the „bottlenecks‟ and „benefits‟ of the EPA.
23 The CARICOM Secretariat 
has  since  developed  a  „Re-worked  roadmap  for  implementation  of  the  CF-EC  EPA‟.
24  The 
general argument is, although the recent global financial and economic crisis originated in the 
developed countries, it has negative consequences in the developing world, such as in the ACP 
states. Some of the negative fall-out relate to the decline in trade and investment flows and 
tourism, reduced remittances, lower prices for certain commodity products, reduced employment 
and  increased  poverty.  This  makes  it  difficult  to  implement  the  EPAs.  The  situation  is 
complicated further when regional integration is in flux. 
 
CARICOM - A Long Pause? 
 
Another major challenge in the Caribbean relates to the apparent stagnation of CARICOM, which 
was established in 1973 following the collapse of the West Indian Federation (WIF). After thirty-
eight years, an assessment of CARICOM provides a mixed picture. I have argued elsewhere that 
whereas CARICOM has achieved relative successes in the realm of functional cooperation, it has 
been less successful in terms of foreign policy coordination and economic integration.
25 In fact, 
CARICOM has chosen a minimalist approach to integration as a community of sovereign 
independent states. It operates within an almost purely intergovernmental framework, which 
undermines its ability to meaningfully deepen integration. Over the almost forty years since its 
establishment, CARICOM has evolved into a push -pull model with moments of renewal and 
stagnation.  Given  Cold  War  machinations  and  the  global  crisis  of  the  1970s  and  1980s, 
CARICOM Heads of Government did not meet for six years – from 1976-1981. The 1989 Grand 
Anse Declaration was an attempt to inject life into an ailing CARICOM with the promise of a 
Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME) in the „shortest possible time.‟ The Report of the 
West Indian Commission (WIC) which followed in 1992 recommended a number of measures to 
resuscitate the  regional  project.  However,  many  of  the recommendations  of the  WIC  (which 
included  an  EU-like  Commission  and  other  common  institutions)  were  not  readily  adopted.  
Based on the Rose Hall Declaration in 2003 CARICOM Heads of Government agreed to the 
establishment of a CARICOM Executive Commission to address its „implementation paralysis‟ 
and  strengthen  the  governance  arrangements.  To  date  that  debate  is  ongoing.  The  Treaty  of 
Chaguaramas was revised in 2001 and the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) was established in 
2005 with the launch of the Caribbean Single Market (CSM) in 2006. However, while twelve 
member states of CARICOM can access the CCJ as a dispute settlement mechanism for the CSM, 
only Guyana, Barbados and Belize are members of the CCJ in its appellant jurisdiction.
26 In fact 
the CCJ has drawn attention to the tension between domestic politics and regional integration.
27 
The CSM became the defining pillar of CARICOM during the last fifteen years or so. 
The overall purpose of the CSM is to integrate the economies of CARICOM into a unified market 
in which people, goods, services and capital move freely and into a single economy that functions 
under the same harmonized economic policies. However, the CSM is riddled with challenges, 
such as the free movement of people and the perceived social dislocations which can ensue.  As I 
explained elsewhere: 
 
…while integration is imperative, it is problematic. For example, deepening  integration 
through a single market increases the size of the region‟s market. It also has the potential 
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to increase the region‟s competitiveness and bargaining power in the global arena. It can 
also optimize the use of human capital and promote development. Widening expands the 
frontiers of a region and enhances its geo-strategic position in the world. Yet, despite 
these  possible  benefits,  a  single  market  can  perpetuate  uneven  development,  create 
winners and losers, engender vexing issues of identity and citizenship and breed social 
dislocations.    Therefore,  effective  regional  governance  arrangements  become  critical. 
However,  while  sound  regional  governance  is  necessary  to  advance  the  pace  of 
integration, it brings to the fore issues of sovereignty, legitimacy and democracy.
28 
 
Recently CARICOM has come in for harsh criticisms. For eminent Caribbean journalist, 
Rickey Singh, „Sick‟ Caricom needs a dose of „people power‟. He makes the point that “the 
bloodstream of our regional integration process is threatened by anaemia and need an infusion of 
people power to resuscitate what we know as Caricom.”
29 Ron Sanders, a former Caribbean 
diplomat sums it up this way: 
 
…What the region needs now is more not less integration. The leaders of CARICOM, 
therefore, should be strengthening and sharpening the regional integration process as a 
vital  instrument  in  improving  the  conditions  of  their  countries  individually  and 
collectively.  
    But  the  process  has  to  start  with  a  willingness  by  leaders  to  talk  with  each  other 
frankly, openly and with empathy, and it has to be infused with an acknowledgment that 
they have side tracked the regional integration process, and must put it back on a main 
track because their countries need it. The conversation has to be underlined by a desire to 
reach collective decisions which take account of the circumstances of each in trying to 
achieve benefits of all. 
    …But the truth is that the regional movement now needs more than a strong Secretary-
general, it requires a complete overhaul of the entire CARICOM machinery, beginning 
with a renewed commitment to regionalism by leaders. New priorities have to be set for 
CARICOM  and  many  of  its  dead-weight  issues  dropped;  both  sufficient  financial 
resources and appropriate skills have to [be] employed to accomplish the priorities which 
must include strategic partnerships with the private sector and with international partners 
including China, India and Brazil to help crank –up economic growth through investment 
and employment. 
    All is not well in CARICOM. Indeed, much of it is ailing, and while the regional 
project weakens, all of its member countries are being left behind in the global race for 
betterment.
30 
 
Caribbean scholar Professor Norman Girvan points to the „original sin‟ of CARICOM 
and argues that CARICOM is suffering from a multiple crises – a crisis of implementation, of 
credibility and legitimacy. Girvan refers to the „original sin‟ as „a two-headed sin. One head is the 
absence  of  supranationality,  or  collective  sovereignty,  which  is  the  underlying  source  of  the 
implementation deficit of the Community and the second is called a „participation deficit.‟ Girvan 
observes  that,  „[s]everal  member  states  are  pursuing  external  associations.  Two  are  in 
UNSASUR, the Union of South American States; and three others are in ALBA. In neither case 
were  there  consideration  of  making  a  CARICOM-wide  collective  agreement  with  these 
configurations.‟
31  This is a major problem for the region. The question is, how do these multiple 
and overlapping configurations relate to one another? Are they unifying forces or sources of 
further fragmentation? Can Caribbean states afford membership in multiple fora? What are the 
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costs and benefits? Who benefits, who loses? Those questions provide no easy answers.   At the 
heart of the debate are questions of solidarity, sovereignty and survival. 
One of the Caribbean‟s eminent statesmen, Sir Shridath Ramphal, recently asked, „Is the 
West Indies West Indian?‟ Ramphal laments the current state of CARICOM, which I will quote at 
length: 
 
…Despite the new external compulsions, therefore, the pursuit of even economic unity, 
which publics largely accepted, has been a passage of attrition. It has taken us from 1965 
to 2010 - 45 years – to crawl through CARIFTA and CARICOM, through the fractured 
promises of Chaguaramas and Grand Anse, and through innumerable pious Declarations 
and Affirmations and Commitments. The roll call of unfulfilled pledges and promises and 
unimplemented decisions is so staggering that in 2011 a cul de sac looms.   
     At Grand Anse in 1989 West Indian political leaders declared that “inspired by the 
spirit  of  co-operation  and  solidarity  among  us  (we)  are  moved  by  the  need  to  work 
expeditiously together to deepen the integration process and strengthen the Caribbean 
Community in all of its dimensions.” They agreed a specific  work programme to be 
implemented over the next four years with primacy given “towards the establishment, in 
the shortest possible time of a single market and economy”. That was 22 years ago. The 
West Indian Commission (also established at Grand Anse) confidently charted the way, 
declaring it a “Time for Action”. West Indian technicians took their leaders to the brink 
with the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas. But there was no action – no political action, 
no political will to act. In twenty-two years, nothing decisive has happened to fulfill the 
dream of Grand Anse. Over those two decades the West Indies has drawn steadily away 
from being West Indian. 
    …Words alone are never enough, except to deceive. As Paul Southwell used to remind 
us  in  Shakespearian  allusion:  “Words,  words,  words;  promises,  promises,  promises; 
tomorrow and tomorrow and tomorrow”. Nothing‟s changed. In the acknowledged quest 
for  survival  (including  political  survival)  the  old  urge  for  „local  control‟  by  those  in 
control has not matured to provide real space for the „unity‟  we say we need. Like 19th 
century colonists we strive to keep our rocks in our pockets – despite the enhanced logic 
of pooling our resources, and the enlarged danger of „state capture‟ by unelected groups 
and external forces while we dally.  
 
…When the unsung benefits of regionalism are no longer available as instruments to 
bolster  local  development,  and  bargaining  with  larger  countries,  and  coping  with  the 
destructive reach of drug trafficking – only then perhaps will Governments be forced into 
reconstructing those vital elements of regional support that neglect had helped to destroy. 
We will then, perhaps, as with CARIFTA in 1965, resume the old cycle of rebuilding 
what we once had, but carelessly destroyed; and so ad infinitum. But let us remember, a 
civilization  cannot  survive  save  on  a  curve  that  goes  upward,  whatever  the  blips  in 
between;  to  go  downward,  whatever  the  occasional  glimpses  of  glory,  is  to  end 
ingloriously. Caribbean civilization is not an exception. It is now as it was ninety-five 
years ago with Marryshow: The West Indies must be West Indian.
32  
 
Ramphal strikes at the heart of the problem: the absence of action and the refusal to 
capitalize  on  cultural  synergies.  From  my  perspective,  CARICOM  is  in  serious  flux  despite 
advances in the realm of functional cooperation. After almost forty years, what has emerged is a 
schizophrenic model. CARICOM has evolved into a 4-Ps framework: it is prime-ministerial, 
paper-based, piece-meal and people-less. The core of the problem lies in the lack of vision and 
the insistence on intergovernmentalism. Or put correctly, just as was the case during the West 
Indian Federation, political leaders do no wish to share power with the center, for the greater 
good. However, all is not lost for the Caribbean. The sub-regional grouping of the Organisation of 
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Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) is showing a relatively mature approach to regional integration, 
despite serious challenges. We will now turn to the OECS. 
 
The Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS): An Overview 
 
The Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)
33 was established by the signing of the 
Treaty of Basseterre on 18 June, 1981. Its main objectives are to promote cooperation, maintain 
unity and solidarity in defence of their sovereignty and territorial integrity, assist member states 
in  realizing  their  obligations  to  the  international  community,  seek  to  achieve  the  fullest 
harmonization  of  foreign  policy  and  establish  joint  overseas  representation,  establish  an 
Economic Union and establish common institutions and take common actions.  
By way of background, the collapse of the West Indian Federation (WIF) in 1962 was 
due in part to disagr eements between the leaders of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. The 
demise  of  the  WIF  was  influenced  by  a  referendum  in  Jamaica  and  that  country‟s  eventual 
withdrawal from the Federation. Eric Williams, then premier of Trinidad and Tobago‟s, followed 
Jamaica and declared a new kind of mathematics – „one from ten leaves zero‟. As the larger 
territories disbanded the WIF, and pursued independence, the smaller territories were left on their 
own. Arthur Lewis analysed what he referred to as „the Agony of the eight.‟
34  These smaller 
territories, most still British colonies, had to devise alternative strategies to survive as viable 
territories.  Therefore, in November 1966 Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts, 
Nevis and Anguilla and St. Lucia formed the West Indies Associated States Council of Ministers 
(WISA).  Those islands gained internal self government from Britain in 1967.  St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines joined WICA in 1969 and gained self government that same year. Montserrat 
remained as a British territory (even till today) but maintained an administrative relationship with 
WISA.
35 This group later evolved into the OECS.
36 
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 Small Size 
 
While CARICOM countries are small states, OECS countries are micro states given their very 
small size (see Figures I & II). 
 
Figure I: Land Distribution Select Western Hemisphere 
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Source: The World Fact Book 2003-2004 cited in Grenade, 2005, pp 67-68.  
 
OECS countries are also very small in terms of population size (see Figures III and IV). 
 
 
 
 
Figure2. Land Distribution – CARICOM & OECS 
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Source: The World Fact Book 2003-2004 cited in Grenade, 2005, pp 69-70. 
 
As the above figures show, smallness is one of the key defining characteristics of the 
OECS (even relative to the rest of CARICOM). In addition to their small size, OECS countries 
are open economies which depend heavily on agriculture, tourism and other services, foreign 
direct investment and remittances. However, when compared to the wider CARICOM some of 
the OECS economies perform relatively well. As Table I depicts, Antigua and Barbuda, St. Kitts 
and Nevis and St. Lucia outperform countries such as Jamaica, Belize, Guyana and Haiti. 
 
Integration in the OECS 
 
In terms of sub-regional governance, these smaller territories inherited a number of common 
institutions which were established during the WIF: the Eastern Caribbean Currency Authority 
(1965), which emanated from the British Caribbean Currency Board (1950), later named the 
Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (1983); the Directorate of Civil Aviation (1957) now called the 
Eastern Caribbean Civil Aviation Authority; and the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court (1967).
37 
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The OECS capitalized on its inheritance and has achieved relatively deeper levels of integration 
relative to the wider CARICOM. The main institutions of the Organisation are the: 
 
  Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court 
  Eastern Caribbean Central Bank    
  Eastern Caribbean Civil Aviation Authority 
 
The revised Treaty of Basseterre (2010) makes provision for the main organs of the organisation 
which are the:  
 
  Authority of Heads of Government of the Member States  
  Council of Ministers  
  OECS Assembly  
  Economic Affairs Council  
  OECS Commission 
 
The OECS has harmonized policies in a number of areas which include energy, tourism, 
air  transportation,  health  reform,  education  reform,  judicial  reform,  foreign  policy  and  trade 
Negotiations.  OECS countries also established a Pharmaceutical Procurement Services and there 
is an OECS News-Link. The Eastern Caribbean Telecommunications Authority (ECTEL) – was 
established  to  oversee  telecommunications  deregulation.  The  OECS  Authority  gives  overall 
direction to the organisation and the OECS Secretariat manages the day-to-day operations. Given 
the relative success of the OECS, both Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago, on separate occasions, 
have engaged the OECS on the possibility of deeper political union.
38 
Despite its strengths, the OECS economies are riddled with challenges.  As the IMF 
reports, “Extremely high and rising regional public debt in the context of a regional currency 
board arrangement has exacerbated the region‟s vulnerability to shocks. The regional public debt 
jumped to above 100 percent of GDP at end 2009, from an average of 93 percent of GDP in 
2006–08,  reverting  earlier  gains  in  debt  reduction.  At  current  polices,  debt  is  either  on  an 
explosive path or stubbornly high at least in some countries.”
39  
In fact, as small open economies which are vulnerable to external shocks, the global 
financial and economic crisis has had negative implications for the Eastern Caribbean Currency 
Union (ECCU). As the IMF reports, “The ECCU has been hard hit by the global economic 
downturn and is faced with a protracted recovery. Reflecting a collapse in tourist arrivals and 
FDI-financed construction activity, real regional GDP contracted sharply in 2009 and growth is 
expected  to  remain  subdued  in  2010–11.  Surging  fiscal  deficits,  the  lack  of  institutional 
arrangements for fiscal consolidation, unsustainable debt levels, and stress in the financial sector 
are threatening the underpinnings of the currency union and the currency board.”
40 The IMF 
reports further that: 
 
    The ECCU is at crossroads as vulnerabilities have intensified. The ECCU consists of 
eight small, open, tourism-dependent island economies which share a common currency 
pegged to the U.S. dollar… The regional currency board arrangement, which continues to 
be an appropriate exchange rate regime, has provided a strong anchor for macroeconomic 
stability, and facilitated financial system development. However, the global financial and 
economic crisis has brought to the fore pockets of significant weaknesses. Surging fiscal 
deficits, the lack of institutional arrangements for fiscal consolidation, unsustainable debt 
levels, and stress in the financial sector are threatening the very underpinnings of the 
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currency union and the currency board. The authorities have responded on a number of 
fronts, but remedial action has been uneven and needs to be intensified in a number of 
areas and countries.
41 
 
What is instructive is that the OECS Authorities „have committed to a coordinated 
regional response to the economic downturn through the Eight-point Stabilization and Growth 
Program, signed by ECCU governments in December 2009. It focuses on the implementation of a 
stabilization package covering financial programs, fiscal reforms, and debt management; a 
stimulus package (public sector investment programs (PSIP) and social and financial safety nets); 
and a more structural focused package, comprising the amalgamation of some indigenous banks 
and reform of the insurance sector.‟
42 
 
The European Union, CARICOM and the OECS 
 
Evidence suggests that the OECS model is closer to that of the EU. It is well established that the 
European  Union  is  the  most  advanced  regional  experiment  although  it  is  a  complex  and  
unfinished project. There is evidence that the EU has experienced deep integration and relative 
successes. European integration has brought stability, peace and economic prosperity to Europe 
and it has strengthened the EU‟s voice in the world. It has also achieved results which would not 
have been possible by individual member states acting on their own. Yet despite its achievements, 
the EU is accused of, among things, „democratic deficits‟, lack of a cohesive foreign and defense 
policy and expansive widening.  The EU‟s approach to integration is a combination of inter-
governmentalism and supranational governance. That is, it sought to create a unique institutional 
structure and adopt decision-making procedures which aim to promote the „common good‟ of the 
Union, without undermining the interests of individual member states.  It must be noted, however, 
that this is not an easy process for the EU.  It has had to and will continue to confront several 
hurdles. Yet, the approach, though complicated, makes useful study.  
The  common  institutions  of  the  EU  play  a  vital  role  in  the  integration  process.  The 
European experience suggests that a common court acts as a glue to sustain integration. In the 
case of CARICOM, the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) was established in 2005 with two 
jurisdiction: an Appellant Jurisdiction  (to replace the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council) to 
consider and determine appeals in both civil and criminal matters from common courts within the 
jurisdiction of member states which are parties to the Agreement Establishing the CCJ and an 
original  jurisdiction  to  discharge  the  functions  of  an  international  tribunal  applying  rules  of 
international  law  in  respect  of  the  interpretation  and  application  of  the  Revised  Treaty  of 
Chaguaramas (12 member states can access this jurisdiction).  To date only Barbados, Belize and 
Guyana have acceded to the Appellant Jurisdiction of the CCJ. However, at the sub-regional 
level, the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court was established in 1967 and predates the 1981 Treaty 
of Basseterre. It is a superior court of record and has unlimited jurisdiction in the member states 
in accordance with the respective Supreme Court Acts. As is the case within the ECJ, The Eastern 
Caribbean Supreme Court has built up a body of community law at the sub regional level. A 
question arises, what is the relationship, if any, between the CCJ and the Eastern Caribbean 
Supreme Court? What are costs implications for the small states of the Caribbean Community to 
financially support both courts? These are issues that should be addressed.  
The European experience also suggests that a parliament is another critical institution to 
sustain integration. The European Parliament is a supranational institution which is elected by the 
citizens of the member states and brings together all the political parties operating in the EU 
member  states.  Within  CARICOM  an  Assembly  of  Caribbean  Community  Parliamentarians 
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(ACCP)  was  established  as  a  consultative  and  deliberative  body  for  the  deepening  of  the 
integration  movement  and  its  objectives  are  clearly  set  out  in  Article  4  of  the  Agreement:
43 
However,  the  ACCP  is  defunct.  As  Girvan  observes  „…the  ACCP  had  no  decision-making 
powers. It was not one of the legally constituted organs of governance of the Community. It 
lacked an independent source of finance…The ACCP appears nowhere in the Revised Treaty of 
Chaguaramas.‟
44  Therefore at the level of CARICOM there is a serious democratic deficiency. 
At the sub-regional level the OECS leadership has decided to include an OECS Assembly in the 
revised treaty of Basseterre (Article 10). It shall „comprise Members who are representatives, as 
provided in this Article, of the members of the Parliament and of the members of the Legislatures 
of the Member States (Article 10.1). Each Parliament of an independent State which is a full 
Member  State  shall  be  entitled  to  elect  five  of  its  members  to  the  OECS  Assembly.  Each 
Legislature of any other Member State shall be entitled to elect three of its members to the OECS 
Assembly (Article 10.2). It is still too early to determine the impact, if any, the OECS Assembly 
will have. Nonetheless this is a step in the right direction to democratise the sub-regional process. 
The EU‟s experience suggests that the EU Commission is one of the key catalyst, which 
has sustained the integration process. One of the cardinal sins of CARICOM is its failure to 
institute  a  CARICOM  Commission.  While  discussions  are  ongoing  about  an  Executive 
Commission,  there  is  no  clear  action  in  this  regard.  However  OECS  leaders  have  agreed  to 
establish The OECS Commission (Article 12), which shall „be the principal Organ responsible for 
the general administration of the Organisation.‟ The Commission shall comprise the Director-
General,  who  shall  convene  and  preside  at  meetings  of  the  OECS  Commission,  and  one 
Commissioner  of  Ambassadorial  rank  named  by  each  Member  State.  A  Commissioner  shall, 
subject to Article 15.4, represent the OECS Commission in the Member State appointing that 
Commissioner. The decisions of the OECS Commission shall be taken by a simple majority vote. 
While this Commission does not perhaps go far enough, it is a step in the right direction. While 
the OECS Commission is not as sophisticated as the EU Commission, there is intent on the part 
of the OECS political leadership to go beyond the CARICOM model in this regard 9at least on 
paper). 
 
Monetary Union is a deep expression of regional integration. In the case of the EU, the 
Eurozone characterizes deep integration. The scope of the paper does not allow me to go into the 
intricacies  of  the  Euro  in  relation  to  the  United  States  dollar  and  other  global  currencies. 
Nonetheless, a common currency is an important imperative in regional integration processes. 
One of the strengths of the OECS is its common currency, which is pegged to the US dollar at 
$2.7. Over the years, the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank and Currency Union (ECCB/ECCU) 
has played a positive role to ensure monetary stability in the ECCU.  This means, in essence, that 
while CARICOM as a whole does not have a common currency, seven of the fifteen CARICOM 
countries already share a common currency, which is an indicator of deep integration. As Table II 
suggests, currency convertibility is one of the challenges which threaten integration at the wider 
CARICOM level.   
                                                            
    
43  CARICOM  Secretariat,  “Agreement  for  the  Establishment  of  an  Assembly  of  Caribbean  Community 
Parliamentarians” (http://www.caricom.org/archives/agreement-accp.htm) accessed March 27 2005. 
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Table II: Currencies: CARICOM and The OECS  
 
Country  Currency  Equivalency 
to the US$1 
     
The Bahamas  Bahamian dollar  Bah$1 
Barbados  Barbadian dollar  Bar$2 
Belize  Belizean dollar  BZ$2 
Guyana  Guyana dollar  G$195.34*  
Haiti  Gourde  G41*  
Jamaica  Jamaican dollar  J$58.24* 
Suriname  Suriname Guilder  SF$2,540**   
Trinidad and Tobago  Trinidad and Tobago dollar  TT$6.2** 
The OECS  East Caribbean dollar  EC$2.7 
 
  *Floating (2003)   
 **Floating (2002)     
 
Source:  CARICOM Secretariat 2005, pp 405-433. 
 
The EU‟s internal market is one of its success stories. It is noteworthy that within the EU 
the economic union of Benelux functions as an economic union even though its members are part 
of the European Union‟s EMU.
45 In the case of the Caribbean, the Caribbean Single Market and 
the OECS Economic Union while offering possibilities are fraught with challenges. It is too early 
to assess the CSM and the OECS economic union. However, a major difference between both 
arrangements is that the new vision for the OECS economic union is to create an OECS supra-
national arrangement and single economic space which would be an area of peace, tranquillity 
and harmony, where things work (utilities, infrastructure) and service (in the public and private 
sector) is excellent in a clean and pristine environment. The Treaty allows for the transfer of 
legislative powers in five specific areas from national parliaments to the OECS Authority, thereby 
strengthening the institutional set up of a full-fledged economic and monetary union.
46 
Unlike CARICOM, the OECS has established  joint diplomatic Missions in Brussels 
(Belgium) (previously in Ottawa Canada and a Joint technical Mission to the WTO in Geneva, 
Switzerland. The OECs has also established an office in Puerto Rico. OECS member countries 
are also part of the Regional Security System (RSS) along with Barbados. On the question of 
                                                            
    
45 Benelux is an Economic Union established in 1958 by Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg. “The Benelux 
Economic Union is one of the world's oldest economic unions. Its philosophy and guiding principles operate within a 
democratic  framework  and  have  served  as  a  model  for  other  economic  unions,  especially  the  European  Union. 
Nevertheless, the importance of the BEU has diminished over the years as the economies of its member countries have 
become  integrated  into  the  European  Union.  The  BEU  is  an  internal  regional  association  within  the  European 
Community, which is in turn the core of the European Union. This relationship continues because the goals of the BEU 
and the goals of the European Community are not in conflict. Despite its lesser stature today, the Benelux Economic 
Union played a vital role in the decades following World War II in rebuilding and modernizing the Benelux countries.” 
See  Benelux  Economic  Union  (BEU)  -  duties,  benefits  http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/encyclopedia/Assem-
Braz/Benelux-Economic-Union-BEU.html#ixzz1EM3LssXa. Accessed 18 February, 2011. 
    
46 Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States, Revised Treaty of Basseterre, 2010.  20   
security, CARICOM has established an office for the Implementation for Crime and Security 
(IMPACS). Research is needed to investigate the relationship between IMPACS and the RSS. 
There may be scope for deeper collaboration or even some merger. 
On the question of foreign policy, the Revised Treaty of Basseterre makes provision for 
the harmonisation of foreign policy. As Article 15.1 states: 
  
   Unless objection is offered by the receiving States or international organisations and 
conferences concerned, Member States may establish and maintain arrangements for joint 
overseas  diplomatic  or  other  representation,  including,  where  appropriate,  the 
accreditation of one representative to one or more States, international organisations or 
conferences (Article 15.1). 
 
A current challenge for the Caribbean surrounds various configurations of integration 
processes in the hemisphere. Currently three OECS member states are members of the Bolivarian 
Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) – Antigua and Barbuda, The Commonwealth of Dominica 
and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. Some OECS counties have relations with China and others 
with Taiwan. The Revised Treaty of Basseterre states: 
 
   Nothing in this Treaty shall preclude any Member State from participating in other 
arrangements either with other Member States or non-Member States provided that its 
participation in such arrangements does not derogate from the provisions of this Treaty 
(Article 19.1).  
   The rights and obligations arising from agreements concluded before the entry into 
force  of  this  Treaty  between  Member  States,  or  between  Member  States  and  other 
countries or organisations, shall not be affected by the provisions of this Treaty (19.2).  
   To the extent that such agreements in Article 19.2 are not compatible with this Treaty, 
the Member State or States concerned shall take all appropriate steps to eliminate the 
incompatibilities established. Member States shall, where necessary, assist each other to 
this end and shall, where appropriate, adopt a common negotiating position (19.3). 
 
This means in essence that the OECS has made provision for such arrangements. What is 
salient here is that in this new dispensation there are overlapping forms of regionalisms and 
cooperation arrangements and small, vulnerable, dependent states are often faced with several 
dilemmas. One dilemma surrounds short term economic gains versus sustainable development in 
the long term. 
Finally, the discussion suggests that the OECS model is much closer to that of the EU 
than the CARICOM model. The OECS Secretariat admits that public announcements have been 
made in various fora about the economic union being modelled after the EU.
47 However, the 
OECS Secretariat warned against the „wholesale adoption‟ of the European Union governance 
model without paying due regard to the socio-economic realities of the EU.
48  When asked about 
the EU‟s views on the OECS economic union, a representative of the EU Delegation to Barbados 
and the Eastern Caribbean had this to say: 
    The EU is very supportive of the OECS Economic Union entering into force. Regional 
integration  is  consistent  with  EC  policy  as  articulated  in  the  European  consensus  on 
Development and the joint Statement on EU Development Policy (December 2005). In 
addition,  the  Cotonou  Agreement  (Article  28)  requires  that  cooperation  under  the 
Agreement  provide  support  for  regional  and  sub-regional  cooperation  and  integration 
objectives  set  by  ACP  countries  and  that  economic  and  trade  cooperation  build  on 
                                                            
   
47 For an analysis of the OECS and the EU see paper  prepared by the Interamerican Development Bank , October 
2003. 
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regional initiatives. This is therefore the basis for the cooperation strategy outlined in the 
European  Community  –  Caribbean  Regional  Strategy  paper  and  regional  Indicative 
Programme 2008-2013, which includes the deepening of OECS integration internally as 
well as within the CSME as one of the focal areas for financing the 10
th EDF. The EU has 
committed, as part of the 10
th EDF Regional program, €6.6 to the OECS Secretariat to 
pursue their economic integration and trade agenda. The OECS is also a major trading 
partner of the EU OECS exports to the EU valued at EC$155M/45M euro. The OECS is 
also a major trading partner of the EU. OECS exports to the EU valued at EC$155M/ 
45M euro (2008) representing 14% of total OECS exports. OECS imports from the EU 
during the same period valued EC$778M/ 227M euro representing 10.8% of total OECS 
imports. The OECS also benefit  from other EU  funding  agencies such as Trade.com 
(including the Hubs and Spokes programme); the UK CART Fund; PROINVEST; and 
the German funded GTI programme (2008).
49 
An assessment of the OECS brings into question the need to rethink Eric Williams‟ „one 
from ten leaves naught,‟ since one from ten did indeed leave nine – the OECS. Time will tell to 
what extent the OECS model can be sustained or whether the „agony of the eight‟ will persists. 
Nonetheless based on historical evidence and the European experience, the common institutions 
should continue to sustain the OECS into the future, despite global uncertainties and domestic 
constraints.  
 
Conclusions  
 
Several broad conclusions can be drawn from the above analysis of CARICOM and the OECS. 
First,  historical  factors  can  propel  or  haunt  integration  processes.  In  the  case  of  European 
integration devastating wars were the impetus for integration. For CARICOM, the ghost of the 
failed British West Indian Federation continues to bedevil the regional process. On the other 
hand, a major reason for the relative success of the OECS is its historical reality. The OECS 
inherited a number of institutions – a common court, a civil aviation authority and a common 
currency from the failed federal venture. The small states and territories capitalized on their 
inheritance. As the EU experience attests, common institutions are a catalyst to sustain regional 
integration, whether at the regional or sub-regional level.  
Second, external forces are a major factor which helps to shape regional projects. For the 
EU, the need to compete with countries such as the USA and now China influences its integration 
process. The WTO and other global governance regimes also play a role in shaping integration. 
While the EU is a global actor, small states such as those in the Caribbean have to navigate an 
unequal global order. The controversy over the CARIFORUM-EC EPA speaks to the tension in 
North-South inter-regionalisms as a consequence of global forces and internal dynamics. During 
the  Cold  War  CARICOM  states  were  divided  along  ideological  lines  which undermined  the 
regional process.   Similarly the global crisis of the 1970s and 80s and the current crisis supports 
the thesis that global forces are both a threat to and an incentive for regional integration.  Another 
issue surrounds multiple configurations of integration processes – for example, ALBA and the 
South American Integration project. While these arrangements provide alternative options for 
small states these multiple forces can inadvertently or otherwise promote fragmentation within 
regional projects. However they bring to the fore tensions between sovereignty, regionalism and 
national imperatives.  
Third, regional integration processes cannot escape the realities of power relations. A key 
question is, where does power lie? In the case of the EU, a combination of factors converge to 
drive the integration process - the larger more powerful states, capitalist interests and lobbyist. 
For CARICOM, there is also a strong divide between the larger and more developed countries – 
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Jamaica,  Trinidad  and  Tobago,  Barbados  and  Guyana  –  and  the  smaller  territories.    The 
MDC/LDC divide is manifested politically, economically and socio-culturally in the Caribbean. 
While the „larger‟ territories are small states in relation to the rest of the world, they assume a 
false sense of superiority in their dealings with the OECS (even when they are outperformed 
economically by some OECS countries – Guyana and Jamaica are cases in point).  The irony is, 
for micro states, such as those in the OECS, this dual marginalization (at the global and regional 
levels) creates an even greater incentive to integrate. If smallness equates to powerlessness then 
there is a logic that leads smaller states to integrate even more.  The hard question is, why do the 
leaders of the OECS appear to have greater political will at the sub-regional level and not at the 
regional level? What are the gaps in political leadership? I argue that the small size of the OECS 
coupled with the perceived superiority of the MDCs serve to intimidate the smaller territories at 
the CARICOM level. This may be a blessing in disguise for the OECS. 
Fourth, sub-regional groups become assimilated into the regional process, when there are 
strong common institutions to create certainty and sustain deep integration. A case in point is the 
BENUIX economic union in relation to the EU. On the other hand, sub-regional groupings tend 
to deepen their own processes when there is uncertainty and fragmentation at the regional level. 
An example is the relationship between the OECS and CARICOM.  What seems to be emerging 
is an interrelationship between the stagnation of CARICOM and the strengthening of the OECS. 
For example when the WIF collapsed, the „little eight‟ had to devise strategies to collectively 
survive and they established the West Indies Associated States. In the initial phase of CARICOM 
when Heads of Government did not meet for six years (1976-81) the Treaty of Basseterre was 
signed to create the OECS in 1981. Again, in the current era, when CARICOM seems to be in 
reverse gear, the OECS launched an economic union. This suggests that as micro states, the 
OECS  is  forced  to  have  a  defensive  posture  viz  CARICOM  to  ensure  their  relevance  and 
viability.   
Finally,  regional  integration  continues  to  be  the  most  viable  option  for  small  states, 
particularly in this complex global era. However, integration processes will continue to grapple 
with global forces and internal constraints. Yet successful regional processes are the ones which 
benefit from  visionary leadership, institute common institutions and democratize the regional 
project.  As  insecurity  and  uncertainty  continue  to  shape  the  global  political  order,  regional 
integration will be one of the complex roadmaps available to navigate the future.  
This paper may have raised more questions than it answered. Therefore, further research 
is  needed  on  sub-regionalism  and  regionalism  in  general  and  the  OECS  and  CARICOM  in 
particular. Comparative research is also needed on other regions in the Global South (such as 
Africa and Latin America) and the influence of the EU‟s model. Another issue which requires 
scholarly scrutiny is the question of overlapping integration processes and multiple cooperation 
and  integration  arrangements  in  Latin  America  and  the  Caribbean  (LAC).  What  are  the 
motivations  for  multiple  projects?  Are  they  sustainable?  What  can  they  mean  for  EU-LAC 
relations?  These are critical questions which require academic probing.  
I end as I began. In the face of uncertainty, corporate enterprises and sovereign states are 
preoccupied with competitiveness and viability as the peoples of the world search for security in 
their daily lives, democracy and hope. Within this context, regional integration will continue to be 
a viable but problematic option. Perhaps more than ever before, scholars and practitioners need to 
bridge divides to enhance the discourse on integration in the contemporary global era. 
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